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Article
A number of integrated care initiatives are ongoing in 
health care systems in the United Kingdom, continental 
Europe, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand 
(Øvretveit, Hansson, & Brommels, 2010; Rosen, Lewis, 
& Mountford, 2011; S. Shaw & Levenson, 2011; Trivedi 
& Grebla, 2011). These initiatives reflect a growing 
awareness that existing care models, tending to be siloed 
and fragmented, are no longer adequate to meet the 
needs of a growing elderly population with complex, 
multiple health needs (Ham & Curry, 2011; Lewis, 
Rosen, Goodwin, & Dixon, 2010; Powell-Davies et al., 
2006). The ethos behind integrated care is to put patients 
first and empower health professionals through improved 
coordination of care among specialists, general practitio-
ners (GPs), and social care services (Goodwin et al., 
2012; Ham & De Silva, 2009), with the ultimate goal of 
improving health outcomes and reducing health care 
costs. Although there is a growing body of literature that 
describes effective integration elements and approaches 
(Goodwin et al., 2012; Light & Dixon, 2004; Shapiro & 
Smith, 2003), literature on practical learning and experi-
ence from the United Kingdom is limited (RAND Europe 
and Ernst & Young, 2012). Considerable attention has 
been paid to organizational processes and structures, but 
little is known about the perceptions and experiences of 
health care providers working in the integrated care 
setting, in particular, how the perceived reasons for their 
engagement as providers of care, or the implications of 
these, play out in the implantation and delivery of inte-
grated health and social care.
In the health care sector, greater staff engagement in 
planning, commissioning, and development of services is 
crucial in ensuring that service changes are properly 
planned and effectively implemented (Richman, 2006; 
Spurgeon, Clark, & Ham, 2011). Enhanced staff engage-
ment is thought to lead to clearer benefits for patients, 
better health care outcomes, and value for money (Bakker 
& Schaufeli, 2008; Clark, 2012; MacLeod & Clarke, 
2009). However, in the United Kingdom, initiatives 
aimed at improving quality of care have not generally 
succeeded in securing full engagement of health care pro-
fessionals (Gollop, Whitby, Buchanan, & Ketley, 2004; 
Jorm & Kam, 2004; Shekelle, 2002). Many factors are 
thought to interact to facilitate or inhibit engagement, and 
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there are likely to be subtle differences in how to best har-
ness the interest and involvement of each professional.
In the integrated care context, securing engagement is 
even more complex, because of the challenges inherent in 
collaborative working across professional boundaries and 
different organizations. Overcoming these challenges has 
proved to be difficult both in the United Kingdom and in 
the United States. The experience from United States sug-
gests that professional beliefs and values present signifi-
cant obstacles to creating culture of change. For instance, 
Gitterman, Weiner, Domino, Mckethan, and Enthoven 
(2003) argue that, for the Kaiser Permanente model to 
succeed, a set of wider socioeconomic and political fac-
tors had to be in place to enable the internal cultural driv-
ers. Similarly, Sidorov (2003) shows how an attempt to 
merge hospital systems was unsuccessful because of the 
wrong management techniques resulting from underesti-
mating the role of cultural differences between the two 
organizations. Because integrating health and social care 
requires changes in behavior and practice, it is important 
to understand which factors drive and affect the engage-
ment of professionals in delivering improvements in qual-
ity and better health care outcomes.
In this article, we explore health care professionals’ 
engagement in implementing and delivering integrated 
health and social care as part of a large-scale integrated 
care pilot (ICP) in North West London, UK. To illuminate 
the dynamics of this engagement, we are informed by 
Saks (2006), who described engagement as “a distinct and 
unique construct consisting of cognitive, emotional, and 
behavioral components . . . associated with individual role 
performance” (p. 602). For Saks, engagement was experi-
enced emotionally and cognitively and could be demon-
strated behaviorally. Following Kahn (1990), Harter, 
Schmidt, and Hayes (2002), and Schaufeli, Salanova, 
Gonzalez-Roma, and Bakker (2002), Saks conceptualized 
engagement as an absorption of resources and the degree 
to which one is attentive to one’s work. For engagement to 
occur, employees need physical, emotional, and psycho-
logical resources (K. Shaw, 2005). Cognitive resources 
relate to employees’ beliefs, working conditions, and lead-
ers; emotional resources concern how employees feel 
about each of those three factors and whether they have 
positive or negative attitudes toward the organization and 
its leaders; behavioral resources concern the physical 
energy displayed and exercised by individuals in under-
taking their roles (Harter et al., 2002; Maslach & Leiter, 
2001). Seen from this perspective, engagement is under-
stood as the extent to which people perform their own 
work role and is related to their emotional experiences 
(May, Gilson, & Harter, 2004; Saks, 2006).
Drawing on the qualitative evaluation of the North 
West London ICP, we examined the work that was carried 
out to achieve each of the engagement components. We 
explored the ways in which professionals articulated their 
engagement and used this to illuminate the wider organi-
zational phenomena in play. We observed that the emo-
tional responses evoked from the constructed interactions 
and relationships between health care providers and the 
pilot’s management team were manifested behaviorally 
in ways that affected providers’ participation in the plan-
ning, implementation, and delivery of integrated care. 
Therefore, we see engagement as a construct that pro-
vides an understanding of processes that are internal to 
professionals but are observable and manifested in their 
behaviors. These behaviors are influenced and repre-
sented by professionals’ norms, rules, values, and atti-
tudes, and enable a picture to be built up of the way 
people work and interact to implement and deliver inte-
grated care.
We acknowledge that engagement is a construct that 
needs to be problematized. However, we argue that its 
ambiguous conceptual foundation does not necessarily 
undermine the importance of examining engagement, but 
rather that there is a need for further inquiry into what 
engagement means in large-scale health care transforma-
tions, and to consider all of the dynamics surrounding 
how individuals and their organizations perceive engage-
ment (Luisis-Lynd & Myers, 2010). Whether referring to 
specific components of integrated care or to the full expe-
rience, health care providers exert a critical role in creat-
ing conditions conducive to the success of bringing about 
change. This role can be referred to as engagement. 
Through a review of the literature and discussions of 
emerging findings from our research, and using in-depth 
qualitative methods, we explored primary care GPs’ and 
hospital consultants’ (HCs) own perceived and enacted 
engagement as providers of care in an integrated care 
context.
The North West London ICP
The population in North West London is one of the fastest 
growing and socioeconomically diverse in the United 
Kingdom, with significant inequalities in life expectancy 
and disease prevalence between different ethnic groups. 
The area is also characterized by a higher than average 
prevalence of diabetes (35% of the population), mainly in 
groups of Indian subcontinent and African Caribbean ori-
gin (Harris et al., 2012). The North West London ICP is a 
large-scale innovative program linking nearly 100 general 
practices, three community service providers, two mental 
health providers, two acute providers, and five local 
authorities. Designed to facilitate improvement in the care 
of more than 500,000 registered patients, the ICP is 
grounded in five principles: invest to save, shift care from 
acute care to community, raise the quality of patient care, 
population-based approach, and alignment of incentives 
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and information and governance (National Health Service 
[NHS] North West London, 2011). At a strategic level, the 
ICP is driven by the Integrated Management Board (IMB), 
five supporting committees, and the operations team that 
provides day-to-day support (for a more detailed descrip-
tion of the pilot, see Harris et al., 2012).
At the heart of the ICP lie specifically established 
financial and governance arrangements, multidiscip-
linary groups (MDGs), and a new information technol-
ogy (IT) tool. The MDG meetings involve representatives 
from the ICP provider organizations, such as GPs, acute 
providers, mental health care, community nursing, 
social care, and other allied health care professionals. 
The primary purpose of these groups is to meet regu-
larly to discuss care of a selected group of patients, and 
learn more about the local health services and their 
remits (Harris et al., 2012). MDGs are chaired by GPs, 
but managed and run by MDG coordinators, whose role 
is to be the first-line contact point for all stakeholders 
and to work with MDG members to identify areas where 
there are bottlenecks in the clinical pathway and map 
solutions. Care for patients is managed via structured 
care plans, which are agreed between the health care 
provider (usually a GP) and a patient. The implementa-
tion of the care plans can be monitored and guided 
through the IT tool, which enables collaborating partner 
organizations to share, manipulate, store, and analyze 
patient data. Specifically, the IT tool enables the extrac-
tion of patient data, performance management, referral 
support, as well as care planning and risk stratification.
Method
Background
This research formed part of a larger mixed-method eval-
uation of the ICP (see Curry et al., 2013; Greaves et al., 
2013). The findings reported here are derived from the 
qualitative evaluation of providers’ perceptions and expe-
riences. A total of 25 semistructured interviews, four 
focus groups with key informants, and more than 65 
hours of non-participant observations of the pilot’s com-
mittee meetings were carried out between January and 
June 2012, following ethics research committee approval 
from the NHS National Research Ethics Service for City 
and East London (ref. 11/LO/1918), UK, in accordance 
with the harmonized Governance Arrangements for 
Research Ethics Committees (GAfREC). Consent to sup-
port and take part in activities within the ICP contributing 
to its evaluation was part of the agreement in organiza-
tions being involved in the pilot. Although consent was 
implicit in our being invited to undertake the evaluation 
at the MDG meetings, to ensure we met best practice 
standards, we sought and obtained verbal consent from 
the individual professionals who were present; however, 
there was no specific ethical requirement to do so, nor to 
obtain written consent.
Non-Participant Observations
We used non-participant observation to inform the design 
of the interview and focus group guides and to help 
answer the more descriptive research questions of the 
evaluation (DeWalt & DeWalt, 2002). It provided early 
lessons on the perceptions and experiences of health care 
professionals, permitting us to check the definitions of 
terms that participants used in interviews and focus 
groups, and to get a feel for how activities were organized 
and prioritized in the pilot (Marshall & Rossman, 1995). 
We followed Spradley’s (1980) framework for carrying 
out participant observation that allowed us not only to 
consider the pilot as a whole but also to make more selec-
tive and focused observations from meetings. The data 
from non-participant observations, mainly in the form of 
field notes, excerpts, and quotations from participants, 
were coded according to the primary participant and the 
type of the meeting observed.
Semistructured Interviews
We adopted a purposive sampling strategy, with knowl-
edge of the group used to select representative subjects 
(Berg, 1995), and contacted providers via email and/or 
telephone to invite them to take part in the interview. We 
interviewed 25 providers, including GPs, general practice 
nurses, community matrons, mental health representa-
tives, social workers, and practice managers. Thematization 
of questions and probes for the interview guide emerged 
from three sources:
a. the relevant literature,
b. previous non-participant observations, and
c. our experience and involvement in interventional 
and public health.
The questions were designed to explore providers’ 
experiences of delivering the pilot, the perceived impact 
of the pilot, interactions with other professional groups 
and organizations, and implications for the wider health 
care system. Interviews lasted between 25 and 45 minutes 
each, and were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim 
by a professional company providing medical transcrip-
tion services.
Focus Groups
We conducted four focus groups in total, each lasting 
approximately 1 hour. They were undertaken with members 
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of multidisciplinary groups and contained a mix of profes-
sionals including GPs, HCs, general practice and commu-
nity nurses, mental health representatives, social workers, 
and primary and secondary care managers. Each focus 
group contained between four and nine professionals. 
Following Krueger and Casey (2000), the focus groups 
were facilitated by a moderator and accompanied by other 
members of the evaluation team. As with the interviews, the 
focus group data were audio-recorded and transcribed ver-
batim by a professional company providing medical tran-
scription services.
Data Analysis
We analyzed data thematically, using constant compari-
son (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) within a modified frame-
work approach (Richie & Spencer, 1994). Two 
experienced qualitative researchers (Ignatowicz and 
Greenfield) independently coded the data from the inter-
views, focus groups, and notes from non-participant 
observations. Codes were created both horizontally (by 
coding each interview or focus group as a standalone her-
meneutic unit) and vertically (by scanning across the data 
for specific terms), and then developed into categories 
and themes. Categories were refined and coding reviewed 
throughout the process for which the ATLAS software 
(Scientific Software Development, 1999) was used. In 
reporting the findings, we used direct quotes from partici-
pants, but these have been anonymized in view of the 
relatively small number of participants that the research 
drew from. In this article, we focus on the views of GPs 
and HCs, because these represented the largest cadre of 
health care professionals in the pilot.
Findings
We identified an evolving engagement process with 
three relatively distinct phases: enthusiasm, antipathy, 
and ambivalence, which were reflected by cognitive, 
emotional, and behavioral elements. In the early stages 
of the pilot, providers were enthused by the vision to 
improve quality of care for their patients and demon-
strated willing involvement and participation. 
Subsequently, when the pilot management shifted toward 
service efficiency and reorganization, providers became 
antipathetic toward the pilot and began to withdraw their 
participation. Later on, as financial gains became a dom-
inant narrative, the remaining providers became ambiva-
lent toward the pilot, and attentive mostly to the financial 
gains that the pilot could bring to their own service. 
These three phases appeared to be inter-dependent; how-
ever, their effective management was likely to be critical 
for sustainable improvements in quality, performance, 
and cost-effectiveness.
Quality Care Narrative Leads to Keen 
Participation
In the set-up stages of the pilot, a strong quality of care 
narrative was important in securing engagement and buy-
in of GPs and HCs. Respondents reported that the vision 
of improving patient care was an important factor in 
influencing their decision to sign up. They told us that, 
because of the fragmentation of the health care system in 
the United Kingdom, single agencies are not well placed 
to resolve difficulties inherent in providing comprehen-
sive care required by people with complex conditions and 
multiple needs:
You know, certainly in London, with diabetes, you cannot 
have everyone being looked after by a specialist in secondary 
care. It makes no financial sense, it doesn’t make good 
medical sense, so clearly you need to be integrated with a 
level you can fast-track people up and down the system and 
access the system when need be. (HC)
Organizations providing health care to patients with 
long-term conditions needed to change, and for our 
respondents, integrated care was the “next logical step” 
and the “natural choice.” GPs and consultants agreed 
that the principles of patient-centered care, which is tai-
lored to the individual needs of a patient, are noble and 
timely. We heard that improving quality of care should 
be at the forefront of the pilot’s agenda and that the 
vision of providing patient-centered care, despite often 
competing priorities, seemed important in motivating 
professionals to work together. Some GPs and consul-
tants indicated that they initially had taken a wait-and-
see attitude to determine whether the pilot was just 
another temporary initiative; others talked about “rein-
venting the wheel.” The consultants in particular men-
tioned that similar initiatives had already been 
undertaken in their organizations, and with varying 
results. Nonetheless, their concern for efficiency and 
quality of care, a narrative that was disseminated consis-
tently and coherently by the pilot’s management team, 
led most to buy in to the pilot as a potential improve-
ment over current ways of working:
Working in the job that I do . . . I see the end product of 
poorly integrated care, I see the end product of . . . I’ll go 
onto a medical ward and I’ll see somebody whose diabetes is 
being cared for, but they’re ignoring their [any comorbidity] 
. . . because physicians are so siloed now, they’ll be ignoring 
the other things or they’ll be ignoring their psychiatric care. 
So I really see at this end how siloed care has become . . . 
integrated care is really important. (HC)
Both GPs and consultants agreed that this afforded the 
momentum and a framework to bind the professionals 
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together, to secure initial buy-in, and provided an enabling 
environment for the pilot to develop.
Top–Down Organizational Change Leads to 
Antipathetic Withdrawal
The transition from buy-in to implementation proved to 
be more challenging. The pilot was designed and imple-
mented at a time when the full extent of the financial 
challenges in the British NHS was becoming apparent 
and there was a need to achieve significant savings in 
North West London. The vision and shared values of pro-
viding patient-centered care were still seen as important, 
but an over-arching economic and political imperative 
emerged that began to affect providers’ perceptions of the 
pilot’s objectives. Some hospital executive’s interests in 
the pilot began to contrast with the views of the health 
care providers who were actually delivering the inte-
grated care:
It was seen as a bit of a, we’ve got to do this, I’ve got to be 
honest, and I think our kind of executive is very, is very keen 
on this. So whether that’s for political reasons or ideological 
reasons, I do not know, but it seemed to be a very good thing 
to be involved in. I think for those on the ground, I think 
we’ve got slightly different views about that. (HC)
Health care providers began to think that this was top–
down politics, implemented by NHS executives who 
were required to meet tight budgets and timescales. As a 
result, many providers felt a strong sense of top–down 
decision-making precluding the possibility of full owner-
ship in the pilot:
Well, I do not think I was given much choice about going 
into it. The consultant here actually went on long-term sick 
leave, and this is one of the things that he had been involved 
in. So I kind of ended up being involved by default really . . . 
so I, kind of, just got a list of dates—hundreds of dates—
thrust at me and said, you need to, you need to go to these. 
That’s how I got involved. (HC)
This was often described as creating tension or antipa-
thy. Providers began to feel that they were being 
“dragged” into the pilot:
They are massively missing the trick, because at the moment, 
it’s like we’re horses and they’re dragging us to water and 
the more they drag me, the less I will actually drink. They 
have to, they have to make it easy for me to want to make it 
work, and that’s the opposite of what I feel they’re doing at 
the moment. (GP)
Communication in particular seemed to be a key con-
sideration of GPs when discussing the pilot. Comments 
ranged from discontentment with lack of feedback and 
rigor about performance to emotional frustration about 
the style of leadership. Many also felt that there was a 
disconnection between the governance decisions of IMB 
and the work in practice:
I just think we [GPs] live in another world. It’s like living in 
a bubble. They [ICP operations team] do not understand that, 
you know, I’ve even been to some of the IBMs or whatever 
you call them. You know, they say, we really, you know, 
admissions are going down . . . they cannot implement 
anything medically without the rigor of statistical analysis 
and back up and they’ve absolutely no evidence whatsoever. 
So it just didn’t ring true. . . . They are more pestilent than 
actually helpful. You haven’t done this, you haven’t sent 
your case yet for the MDG, you know, you haven’t done 
enough care planning. (GP)
This antipathy was intensified by the executives’ 
urgency to implement the pilot. A strong expectation 
from the health care trusts’ executives, operations team, 
and project leads to deliver made the GPs and consultants 
question its success. Although providers were keen to be 
part of the development of pilot’s future objectives, they 
were frustrated at not having been sufficiently involved in 
decision-making. One GP said, “There’s very little any-
one can do to affect the way it’s going forward . . . deci-
sions have already been made . . . I do not feel that we’ve 
been sufficiently involved in those decisions.”
GPs, in particular, were concerned about the lack of 
local ownership of the pilot and involvement in the pro-
cess of decision-making. One respondent commented on 
their disappointment with the fact that, in the set-up 
stages, the pilot appeared to be sold to many as GP and 
primary care led, whereas in practice, it felt as though the 
model was delivered to them rather than with them:
They [the ICP] made you feel that this was all going to be 
your pilot and anything you wanted would be down to you 
locally. So they kind of made you feel that you could maybe 
negotiate the funding that went with it; obviously we knew 
the overall funding envelope. Whether it was from funding 
to what a care plan really was, to how the MDG would 
function. GPs were given the impression that this would be 
something that they would be very much in control of per se, 
but they were pretty much within reason. The minute that we 
first went to the negotiations around how much, let’s talk, 
you know, talk about either finance or how often we should 
meet, who should meet, what a care plan was; all this stuff 
was completely different, was the reality. (GP)
Both GPs and consultants were aware that there was a 
political pressure for the pilot to succeed, but they were 
confused by what they were to be measured against, or 
what exactly the correct outcome was supposed to be. The 
original patient-centered narrative had become lost within 
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an organizational change narrative. Combined with a top–
down management style, the ensuing antipathy for the ICP 
led to a gradual withdrawal by some health care providers, 
at times vocally at ICP board meetings.
Financial Imperative Leads to Provider 
Centeredness
Anticipated financial savings from the pilot became a 
dominant narrative at senior executive levels. The emer-
gence of a narrative based on financial resilience and a 
sense of urgency to effect wide-scale health sector reform 
couched tenuously in pilot form conspired to reveal exist-
ing tensions and levels of mistrust rooted in prior histories. 
Our respondents reported a history of difficult relation-
ships between some organizations that became self-rein-
forcing: “GPs thought it was all [name of health care 
organization] and there was a slight mistrust of [same name 
of health care organization]. No one trusted anyone in 
terms of what the hell this [the ICP] was about” (HC).
A major concern for the pilot’s management was how 
to maintain provider engagement. There was recognition 
among our key informants that, in the longer term, the 
pilot needed to focus on maintaining momentum and 
moving toward stabilization, as well as realizing the ben-
efits of financial savings and quality improvements. 
However, the pilot was mostly regarded as unlikely to 
achieve its full impact within its first year. There were 
concerns that because the pilot was being pushed to suc-
ceed, it was not given the time needed to mature. For 
instance, a consultant expressed concerns about the fact 
that the pilot was implemented without developing the 
necessary infrastructure: “I mean, I know the plusses of 
that system—I’m not, you know, hostile against it, but 
you cannot just suddenly impose that system without 
bricks and mortar and have the critical mass of people 
working together” (HC). Therefore, professionals saw 
the pilot as being “mission impossible,” in particular 
because of the challenges inherent in implementing such 
a large health care system intervention dependent on cul-
tural change.
Some GPs and consultants started to question the 
pilot’s overall impact and the appropriateness of its inter-
ventions, particularly the multidisciplinary group 
meetings:
It is rare for there to be a major impact on patient care, and I 
cannot think of any in whom an admission has been avoided 
as a result of discussion [in the MDG meeting]. (GP)
Keep saying this is going to save money but most 
hospitals have deficits so people do not go to hospital—
and that reduces funding and closure of the wards and 
hospitals. (HC)
The initial enthusiasm for the pilot gave way to skepti-
cism as the “reality” of the pilot did not live up to profes-
sionals’ expectations:
It’s like a million ton super tanker going down—it cannot be 
stopped . . . despite countless occasions of trying to get 
people to see sense this is never going to work. (GP)
A washout from start to finish. It couldn’t be more different 
to what we were promised. Mars and Jupiter. (GP)
As gradual disillusionment with the pilot set in, cou-
pled with the “us vs. them” sentiment developing among 
health care providers, health care providers began to attri-
bute greater value to their own financial incentive struc-
tures within the pilot. GPs became more concerned with 
the potential for return on investment, with some com-
plaining that payment did not reflect the time and effort 
that needed to be emotionally invested to achieve the 
pilot’s aims:
So [person’s name] found a system whereby we break even 
on the elderly [care plans], right? But break even? GPs do 
not really go for it . . . but the key thing is that, when you 
look at it, [person’s name] said that you’re really making a 
loss on it, if you are employing nurses, so you cannot ask 
GPs to take on something new which is either going to break 
even or lose them money. (GP)
I simply judge it on how much work it is and what we’re 
paid for. (GP)
Health care providers became far more preoccupied 
with the administrative, structural, and organizational 
issues that they faced. This was usually articulated in 
terms of the investment of time in attending the MDGs, 
duplication of work with care plans, and frustration with 
the IT tool. One HC told us,
No concept of the fact that my diary’s booked up three or 
four weeks in advance and having a very short notice to 
attend some MDGs, I think a major concern for me. And 
completely inexplicable is why they have different MDGs 
but at the same time on the same day, because I cannot split 
myself in half.
Others mentioned that if the bureaucracy and the 
workload remained as they were, GPs will most likely not 
want to stay involved: “I think the biggest challenge the 
ICP will face is if it does not make it more, it does not 
make it a leaner, more salient process for the GPs, they’ll 
walk actually. I’m pretty sure of that” (HC).
Although health care providers continued to partici-
pate and be involved in the pilot, they noted a palpable 
change in their emotional commitment to it. They became 
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somewhat ambivalent with respect to whether the pilot 
was achieving the lofty goals it set out to achieve. As the 
financial imperative narrative took hold, and the pressure 
to reorganize acute and community services became the 
clear underlying driver for the pilot, its activity and its 
value came to be measured by health care providers in 
terms of its potential to bolster income or show value for 
money—not to the local health economy, nor to the 
patient population, but to individual providers.
Discussion
The research reported here explored professionals’ per-
ceptions of their engagement in the development and 
implementation of an integrated health and social care 
initiative. Saks (2006) described engagement in terms of 
three seemingly static components. However, we noticed 
how engagement might change over time as an evolving 
process dependent on personal, social, and organizational 
factors. Advancing Saks, we found that the process of 
engagement is ongoing and fluid, requiring clear goals, 
credible leadership, and transparency, and for integrated 
care to be effective, this engagement needs to be well 
managed.
We noted a distinct evolving engagement experience. 
In the early stages, the pilot’s managers successfully har-
nessed health care providers’ enthusiasm for the pilot by 
drawing on common shared values of improving quality 
of patient care through improved coordination. During 
the following months, the predominant narrative shifted 
to that of service reorganization and efficiency savings, 
and a top–down management style that led to tension and 
antipathy among the health care providers. Many with-
drew from the pilot, dissatisfied with both the reduced 
autonomy and emphasis on organizational change. In the 
third stage, the remaining health care providers them-
selves began to view the pilot more in terms of service 
reorganization, rather than the loftier, emotive values of 
patient quality of care. This manifested itself in a some-
what ambivalent preoccupation only for the financial 
gains and savings that the pilot could bring to their own 
organizations. These findings are represented schemati-
cally in Figure 1.
As Ham, York, Sutch, and Shaw (2003) point out, the 
difficulties associated with managing change in health 
care organizations are well acknowledged. Past research, 
for instance, suggests that health care professionals tend 
not to be convinced that the change will bring improve-
ment in patients and/or their working lives, and that fac-
tors such as increased workloads or new ways of working 
are often viewed negatively by professionals (Ford, Ford, 
& McNamara, 2002; Giangreco & Peccei, 2005; Gollop 
et al., 2004). The analysis of perceptions of the GPs and 
HCs in this study indicated the contradictions and ten-
sions that it might involve. Their engagement was neither 
linear nor easily predicted; rather, the extent and type of 
engagement varied over time. In the light of Saks’s per-
spective on engagement, the health care professionals in 
this study exhibited different types of emotional and 
behavioral engagement depending on the predominant 
narratives at each developmental stage. A strong sense of 
participation and enthusiasm was reported when the pre-
vailing narrative was patient centeredness or care quality, 
a tendency to withdraw and exhibit signs of antipathy 
when the prevailing narrative was top–down organiza-
tional change, and a general sense of ambivalence and 
preoccupation with own financial gain when the prevail-
ing narrative was efficiency savings in the local health 
care economy.
Nurturing provider engagement requires a two-way 
relationship (Robinson, Perryman, & Hayday, 2004) 
between those who deliver the integrated health and 
social care and leaders. For change to be successful, all 
professionals are expected to be actively involved in the 
change process (Oswald, Mossholder, & Harris, 1994), to 
recognize that there is a clear need for change (Armenakis 
& Harris, 2009), and the benefits of change need to be 
properly communicated to them (Dent & Goldberg, 
1999). To enable engagement, the expectations and moti-
vation of all parties involved need to be understood and 
managed. Managers should not expect too much too 
early. Challenging savings targets and ambitious goals 
adversely affected health care providers’ engagement in 
this study. The level and type of engagement might vary 
during an integrated care project and so structures and 
processes need to be developed to enable managers to 
Engagement dimension Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4
Cognitive Quality care Top-down change Financial imperative ……
Emotional Enthusiasm Antipathy Ambivalence ……
Behavioural Participation Withdrawal Provider-centeredness ……
Figure 1. Evolving engagement experience.
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monitor these changes. This will support improved com-
munication and in turn shared responsibility for the 
project.
Saks (2006) argued that engagement might represent a 
form of obligation. Hence, if organizations offer support 
to their employees, they might feel obliged to become 
cognitively, emotionally, and physically engaged in their 
work role. Nevertheless, as Saks conceded, not all forms 
of support or resources will result in securing engage-
ment. Reward and recognition, for example, are not 
related to engagement after perceived organizational sup-
port and other job characteristics are controlled for. 
Consistent with this perspective, the perceptions of the 
health care professionals in this study indicated that with-
out support and resources from the pilot’s managers and 
their organizations, individuals are less likely to be cogni-
tively, emotionally, and physically engaged.
The contribution of this research lies in its focus on 
provider engagement, and how it affects and drives inte-
grated care. Representing processes of integrated care 
through the construct of engagement allowed us to elabo-
rate on the complexities of implementing a large-scale 
program of change. We acknowledge that engagement is 
a multidimensional and ambiguous concept and yet, we 
have found the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral 
engagement framework to be useful in understanding the 
empirical findings from the ICP evaluation. The provid-
ers’ experience of the pilot can be understood in terms of 
their emotional engagement with prevailing narratives. It 
suggests that managers of organizational change pro-
cesses in integrated care might benefit from using this 
framework to find opportunities for successful change 
management. Provider engagement is fluid, organic, and 
changeable, and managers need to be cognizant of factors 
that enhance or optimize it. Starting with a clear and 
shared goal of integrated care is important, but the clarity 
of goals is essential, not only as a means of generating 
shared objectives but also in providing ongoing momen-
tum to integration (Rosen et al., 2011).
Given that engagement is gaining increasing promi-
nence as a focus of organizational change and govern-
ment policy in the United Kingdom, further detailed 
investigation is needed. The complex relationship 
between engagement and integrated health and social 
care should be an area attracting increasing attention, 
because there is sparse empirical data to support an evi-
dence-based discussion. A debate is needed about how 
integrated care initiatives, such as the one discussed here, 
can be better facilitated in health care systems, where 
many structures and systems are seemingly working 
against it (Greaves, Harris, Goodwin, & Dixon, 2012).
Finally, the results of this study should be considered 
in the light of its limitations. The present findings rely on 
the observations, analyses of interviews and focus groups, 
and inferences of researchers and the participants to iden-
tify those factors that appeared most relevant to the per-
ceptions of engagement. Although we reduced the 
likelihood of selection bias by interviewing a wide range 
of health professionals and by triangulating our findings 
with other observations and document analyses, we can-
not assume that the data that we obtained are representa-
tive of the experiences of all the providers in the ICP. Our 
data were analyzed separately by two researchers who 
independently developed coding schemes before discuss-
ing any coding ambiguities, and refined codes to resolve 
discrepancies. However, as is usual in qualitative 
research, we cannot assume that our coding schemes and 
interpretations accurately and precisely reflect the lived 
experience of the providers.
Conclusion
Health care leaders and managers need to be aware of the 
impact of professional engagement, understand its value 
and drivers, and promote change in ways that appeal to 
health care professionals if they are to succeed in moving 
the integrated care agenda forward.
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